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Molly M. Kelly 
  
After twenty years of adjudication, the Montana Supreme Court 
affirmed the City of Helena’s right to 13.75 cfs from Ten Mile Creek, the 
city’s primary water source. The Court found a statute allowing cities and 
municipalities to exercise water rights that have gone through extended 




In 1982, the City of Helena claimed water rights dating from the 
1860s, despite prolonged periods of non-use.1 Andy Skinner and the 
Community of Rimini, both junior water rights holders to Ten Mile Creek, 
objected.2 In 2005, the Montana Legislature amended the water rights 
claims statutes and formally recognized municipality nonabandonment 
despite periods of nonuse, if certain criteria were met. The objectors 
argued the 2005 amendment to the municipality non-use exception was 
impermissibly retroactive and needed a retroactivity clause as required by 
the Montana Code.3 The Montana Supreme Court disagreed and found the 
amendments permissible because they were procedural, rather than 
substantive.4 The Court recognized the Montana Legislature’s codification 
of the “growing cities doctrine.”5 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In the 1800s, miners used water from Tenmile Creek near Helena, 
Montana for silver mining.6 When they no longer had use for the 
appropriated water, some miners sold their water rights to the Helena 
Water Works Company.7 A 1903 decree declared the Helena Water Works 
Company (“Company”) the owner of the first two rights on Tenmile 
Creek.8 Taken together, the two water rights total 550 miner’s inches 
(“MI”), and have a flow rate of 13.75 cubic feet per second (“cfs”).9  
                                                 
1.  City of Helena v. Community of Rimini, ¶ 8, 388 Mont. 1, P.3d 1 
(Mont. 2017). 
2. Id.  
3. Id. ¶ 15.  
4. Id. ¶ 17.  
5. Id. ¶ 36.  
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At the time of the decree to the Company, it was using two points of 
diversion from the stream.10 The first point diverted through an open ditch, 
into a water treatment facility, and then went through two sixteen-inch 
pipelines to the City of Helena (“City” or “Helena”).11 The City replaced 
the open ditch in 1922 with an eighteen-inch concrete diversion pipeline 
called the “Rimini Pipeline.”12 The Rimini Pipeline’s capacity is 13.15 
cfs.13 After construction, and after the City stopped utilizing the Yaw Yaw 
ditch (described below) for municipal purposes, all of Helena’s Tenmile 
Creek diversions flowed through the Rimini Pipeline.14 Helena’s total 
claim is 13.75 cfs, so Rimini Pipeline’s 13.15 cfs capacity is 0.60 cfs less 
than Helena’s entire Tenmile Creek water rights.15 
The second original point of diversion was downstream of the 
treatment facility, diverting through an open channel called the Yaw Yaw 
ditch.16 In 1919, after Helena acquired the Company’s facility and water 
rights, it ceased using the Yaw Yaw ditch for municipal purposes.17 The 
City continued to lease the ditch for agricultural purposes and maintain the 
facilities for emergencies.18  
In 1929, the City commissioned an engineering report that 
identified restricted capacity for the two sixteen-inch pipelines, which 
limited their capacity to 5.50 cfs.19 In 1948, the City built a new twenty-
four-inch pipeline with a capacity of 13.75 cfs.20 This enabled the City to 
divert 13.15 cfs through the Rimini Pipeline, through the treatment facility, 
and then through the new twenty-four-inch pipeline to Helena.21  
The City filed water rights claims for the two rights in 1982.22 
Andy Skinner, a junior water rights holder, and the Community of Rimini, 
objected to the City’s claims.23 Twenty years of adjudication culminated 
in this decision.  
In 2011, Water Master Hugh B. McFadden, Jr. (“Master”) found 
against the City’s claims to the entire water rights from the two original 
rights. He found that the City abandoned 7.35 cfs of its rights to Tenmile 
Creek.24 In 2013, the Water Court held that the Master erred because he 
did not consider Montana’s presumption of municipal nonabandonment 
statute.25 On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, the case was 
                                                 
10. Id. ¶ 5. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. ¶ 6. 
13. Id.  
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. ¶ 5. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. ¶ 7. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. ¶ 3. 
23. Id. ¶ 8.  
24. Id. 
25. Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-227(4)). 
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remanded to address “procedural errors and ambiguities in the Water 
Court’s order.”26 On remand, the Water Court reversed and found the City 
abandoned their water rights under the common law, but ordered briefs on 
abandonment under Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-227(4).27 After the parties 
composed briefs on the issue, the Water Court held that under the 
nonabandonment statute, “evidence established a presumption that the 
City did not intend to abandon 7.35 cfs.”28 The Water Court also found 
that the City abandoned 0.60 cfs in the Rimini Pipeline, the difference 
between the 13.15 cfs capacity of the pipeline and 13.75 cfs, the capacity 




A. The nonabandonment statute is not impermissibly 
retroactive. 
 
In 2005, the Montana Legislature amended the nonabandonment 
statute to “create a presumption of nonabandonment for all water rights 
claimed for municipal use.”31 Skinner argued that because the amendment 
did not contain a retroactivity clause, as required by Montana law, it could 
not be retroactively applied to this particular water rights claim dating 
from the 1860s.32 
The Court held that there was no retroactive application of the law 
because the 2005 amendments were procedural, not substantive.33 Because 
of this distinction, the Court held that the amendments fell outside of 
Montana law, which states that unless expressly declared, none of the law 
contained in any Montana statute is retroactive.34 The Court called 
attention to the fact that it has continually held that “[a]lthough the general 
rule of law [was] that a statute is not to be applied retroactively, an 
exception to that rule [was] a change in a law that is merely procedural 
rather than substantive.”35  
The 2005 amendments changed the municipal abandonment 
inquiry’s burden of proof, which is a procedural change, not substantive.36 
The Court cited Royston, where the Court had affirmed that an amendment 
to Montana law dealing with changing appropriation rights modified the 
                                                 
26. Id.  
27. Id. ¶ 9 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-227(4)(2015)). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-227(4)(2015)). 
30. Id. ¶ 10. 
31. Id. ¶ 16. 
32. Id. ¶ 15. 
33. Id. ¶ 17. 
34. Mont. Code Ann. § 1-2-109 (2015). 
35. City of Helena, ¶ 17 (citing Saint Vincent Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 261 Mont. 56, 61, 862 P.2d 6, 9 (1993)). 
36. Id. ¶ 20.  
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procedural aspect, not the substantive law.37 Based on Royston, the Court 
found the 2005 amendment only changed the assignment of the burden of 
proof, not actual, vested water rights.38 This modification was procedural, 
and not a substantive retroactive application of the law in violation of 
Montana Code Annotated § 1-2-109.39 
 
B. The Water Court did not err by reinstating 7.35 cfs of 
Helena’s Tenmile Creek water rights. 
 
The Water Court, using the nonabandonment statutory analysis, 
determined that the City did not intend to abandon their 7.35 cfs water 
right.40 To determine whether the Water Court’s findings were correct, the 
Court made two determinations: (1) the Water Court’s findings as to the 
nonabandonment statute’s application were not clearly erroneous;41 and 
(2) Skinner had not successfully established an intent to abandon by the 
City.42 
The Court reiterated the general presumption behind abandonment in 
water rights, stating that “abandonment of a water right requires both non-
use and intent to abandon.”43 The amended statute allows that if a water 
right is claimed for municipal use by a city, it can be presumed to not be 
abandoned, if a city has regularly maintained the systems for the “future 
municipal use of the water right,” conducted a formal survey regarding 
using the water right for municipal supply, or maintain the facilities for the 
water system.44 
Here, the Water Court found, and the parties did not dispute, the City 
had “continuously and partially used each water right since the date of the 
Decree.”45 The Court agreed with the Water Court’s findings and upheld 
that “construction of the Rimini Pipeline established a presumption of 
municipal nonabandonment.”46 The construction of the 1921 pipeline 
established that the City intended to use the municipal water right in the 
future, thus creating a presumption of nonabandonment required by the 
nonabandonment statute.47 Furthermore, the Court found evidence to 
                                                 
37.  Id. ¶ 18 (citing Matter of Application for Change of 
Appropriation Water Rights Nos. 101960-41S and 101967-41S by Royston, 249 
Mont. 425, 816 P.2d 1054 (1991)). 
38. Id.  
39. Id. ¶ 22.  
40. Id. ¶ 32; see Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-227(4) (2015). 
41. City of Helena, 388 Mont. at ¶ 26.   
42. Id.  ¶ 26, 32. 
43. Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added) (citing 79 Ranch v. Pitsch, 204 Mont. 
426, 432, 666 P.2d 215, 218 (1983)). 
44. Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-227(4) (2005). 
45. City of Helena, 388 Mont. at ¶ 24 (citing City of Helena v. Cmty. 
of Rimini, Case No. 411-67, Mont. Water Court (2015) (hereinafter “Water 
Court Decision”)). 
46. Id. ¶ 26. 
47. Id.  
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satisfy the other statutory requirements of the nonabandonment statute.48 
Specifically, the Court found that the City commissioned an engineering 
report in 1929 that discussed a new transmission line to make full use of 
the City’s water rights from Tenmile Creek to meet current needs and 
future growth.49 The Court finally found that the City maintained the Yaw 
Yaw ditch for other purposes, such as irrigation and emergency use, which 
presumed nonabandonment even though it was not using the water rights 
for the municipal water supply.50   
 The Court upheld the Water Court’s rejection of the Master’s 
finding that Skinner had rebutted the presumption of nonabandonment.51 
The Master had also determined that because the sixteen-inch transmission 
lines could not carry the full capacity, due to leakages and other “losses 
that the City could not have predicted when it constructed the pipelines in 
1903,”52 this was non-use and the City had abandoned their rights to the 
lost water.53 The Court found the Master’s determination on this point 
erroneous and upheld the Water Court’s rejection.54 There is a 
presumption of nonabandonment because the unplanned undersized 
delivery system was not enough to demonstrate an intent to abandon.55  
 
C. The City did not abandon 0.60 cfs of its Tenmile Creek water 
rights. 
 
The Master determined that because the actual capacity of the 
Rimini Pipeline was less than the amount decreed, 13.15 cfs and 13.75 cfs 
respectively, the City abandoned the difference of 0.60 cfs due to non-
use.56 The Water Court agreed.57 However, on appeal, the Court 
recognized the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the nonabandonment 
statute for municipalities: to recognize the “great and growing cities 
doctrine.”58 Originating in Colorado, the doctrine supports cities’ planning 
efforts for future water needs and “requires flexibility in such planning 
efforts.”59 This doctrine allows a city to retain their water rights through 
periods of non-use if the city “takes the affirmative steps prescribed by the 
statute.”60 These affirmative steps include building a larger-capacity 
pipeline or retaining the ditch for emergency purposes,61 as Helena did 
with the Yaw Yaw ditch. Recognizing the Legislature’s intent to establish 
                                                 
48. Id. ¶ 27. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. ¶ 28. 
51. Id. ¶ 29. 
52. Id. ¶ 31. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. ¶ 32.  
55. Id.  
56. Water Court Decision, 13. 
57. Id.  
58. City of Helena, 388 Mont. at ¶ 36. 
59. Id. ¶¶ 36, 38; see Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-227(4) (2015). 
60. City of Helena, 388 Mont. at ¶ 38. 
61.  Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-227(4)(a)-(g) (2015). 
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the growing communities doctrine when enacting the nonabandonment 
statute, the Court found that though the City built a smaller pipeline 
originally, it intended to build a larger one in the future, and thus is 




Justice Rice, joined by Justice McKinnon and Justice Baker, dissented 
from the majority’s holding. Justice Rice’s dissent disagreed with the 
finding that the 2005 nonabandonment statute was not retroactive.63 The 
dissent analyzed the history of water rights in Montana and the historical 
significance of the beneficial use doctrine.64 Specifically, it cited many 
Montana Supreme Court cases supporting the conclusion that “non-use, in 
and of itself, [was] sufficient evidence to prove an intent to abandon.”65 It 
cited many water rights adjudication decisions that established that 
“because a water right is founded on application for a beneficial use, a 
water right holder may lose the water right through abandonment.”66 
The dissent argued that the majority’s reliance on Royston, finding 
merely a procedural change, was misguided. Royston involved “purely a 
shift of the burden of proof in a water case,”67 holding that the 1972 
Constitution “[did] not include the right to not have to carry a burden of 
proof.”68 Since Royston was not a substantive change in the law, the 
retroactive requirement did not apply. However, the dissent argued that 
the nonabandonment statute definitively changed the substantive law.69 
The dissent contended that changing the favorable presumption for a city 
when it only uses part of a water right changes the levels of proof from 
city to challenger, “regardless of period of non-use.”70 According to the 
dissent, this change is not a procedural change, but a substantive one that 
is impermissibly retroactive and demands a different analysis for the 




The Rimini holding recognizes the “growing cities doctrine” of 
western water law, maintaining cities’ water rights through extended 
periods of nonuse if they meet certain statutory requirements. The City 
                                                 
62. City of Helena, 388 Mont. at ¶ 39. 
63. Id. ¶ 47 (Rice, J., dissenting).  
64. Id. ¶¶ 49-53 (Rice, J., dissenting).  
65. Id. ¶ 53 (Rice, J., dissenting).  
66. Id. ¶ 52 (Rice, J., dissenting) (citing In re Adjudication of Water 
Rights of Clark Fork River, 254 Mont. 11, 15-17, 833 P.2d 1120, 1123-24 
(1992)). 
67. Id. ¶ 56 (Rice, J., dissenting). 
68. Id. ¶ 55 (Rice, J., dissenting). 
69. Id. ¶ 57 (Rice, J., dissenting). 
70. Id. ¶ 59 (Rice, J., dissenting). 
71. Id. ¶ 62 (Rice, J., dissenting). 
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maintained a presumption of nonabandonment because it maintained 
water supply systems, conducted formal studies regarding the water rights 
and the municipal use, and maintained the facilities for emergency use. 
Furthermore, the nonabandonment amendment was a procedural change 
and not impermissible retroactive.  
  
